The Resurrection Match of New Power Has No "Friends of Time"

WM Motor, HiPhi, and Jiyue resumed production capacity in July, but the technological gap and consumer trust deficit pose the biggest obstacles to their revival.

"Revival Match" Kicks Off: Will Emerging Car Companies Make a Comeback or Sing Their Swan Song?

When the industry generally believes that "elimination means the end," a group of so-called "disappeared" new energy vehicle companies are collectively hitting the restart button in 2025. WM Motor has announced it will resume production of the EX5/E5 in September; HiPhi is mired in restructuring deadlock due to a Middle Eastern investor backing out; and Jiyue is accelerating its restructuring negotiations...

This seemingly sudden "resurrection wave" is actually the final struggle on the brink of survival between multiple capital forces and car companies after the new energy vehicle industry has entered the "red ocean slaughter stage."

However, the market landscape has shown a "6+3+1" stratified differentiation (the leading players take 60% of the share, the second-tier competes for 30%, and the tail end is left with only 10%). The trust gap among consumers is difficult to repair, and the intertwining of technological disparity and financial chain concerns persists.

The outcome of this "revival round" may be even more brutal than the initial elimination.

1. Dual Engines of Capital and Policy: The "Resurrection Logic" and Underlying Game of New Forces

Using "Resource Dependence Theory" for analysis, the essence of the revival of car companies is the reallocation of capital and policy resources. The "revival wave" of the new energy vehicle industry is not accidental, but the result of the tripartite game between capital, policy, and the market.

From the capital side, the entry of cross-sector capital such as Baoneng Group and EV Electra is essentially a bottom-fishing opportunity seeking "distressed assets."

Taking WM Motor as an example, its new investor, Shenzhen Xiangfei, is closely associated with the Baoneng Group. The legal representative, Huang Jing, also controls key enterprises such as Kunshan Baoneng Auto. Meanwhile, Baoneng itself is deeply mired in a debt crisis of 50 billion yuan, yet still attempts to revitalize its assets through the restructuring of WM Motor.

This "debt-financed car ownership" model exposes the capital market's misjudgment of the new energy vehicle industry as "overvalued and low-risk"—Baoneng may have regarded WM Motor as a vehicle for telling a "rebirth story" to the financial market, rather than truly believing in its technology or market potential.

The policy side has provided a buffer space for revival. According to Tianyancha data, China's new energy vehicle sales are expected to reach 16.5 million units (including exports) in 2025, with a penetration rate surpassing 50%. Technological iterations (such as solid-state batteries and megawatt-level fast charging) are creating opportunities in niche markets. Local governments, aiming to preserve employment and stabilize the industrial chain, have provided resumption subsidies and technical renovation support to companies like WM Motor, and have even included them in public procurement systems.

For example, the Wenzhou municipal government established a special task force to coordinate local supply chain cooperation, attempting to reduce the risks of resuming production through policy support. However, policy benefits are essentially "blood transfusions" rather than "hematopoiesis." With WM Motor's 20 billion yuan debt and HiPhi's 15.7 billion yuan book liabilities, government subsidies alone are unlikely to fill the financial black hole.

The market side shows a "tale of two extremes." Leading car companies (BYD, Tesla) build moats through economies of scale and technological barriers, while trailing car companies are caught in a "low-price internal competition."

The EX5/E5 platform that WM Motor plans to resume production with is five years behind mainstream technology, lacking an 800V platform and retaining only L2-level intelligent driving systems, making its product shortcomings obvious.

The dual push of capital and policy is essentially to secure a "3-6 month critical window period" for car companies. If WM Motor cannot demonstrate the feasibility of the EX5's target of ten thousand units by the end of the year, or if HiPhi cannot resolve the capital injection default crisis, the revival plan will quickly collapse.

II. Trust Fractures and Technological Fault Lines: Reviving Automakers' "Double Death Trap"

The competition in the new energy vehicle industry has long since shifted from "product competition" to "trust competition." According to the theory of the trust economy, consumer trust is an "intangible asset" for automakers' survival.

The bankruptcy histories of car companies like WM Motor and HiPhi fundamentally represent a "systemic collapse" of trust assets.

WM Motor has severely damaged its reputation due to incidents such as spontaneous combustion accidents, disputes over battery locking, and being blacklisted by the 315 Consumer Rights Day Gala. During its bankruptcy period, car owners are facing difficulties such as discontinued updates for the car's system, lack of after-sales service, and difficulty in finding parts.

For example, some car owners, unable to find original factory parts due to a broken door handle, end up having to dismantle the car for repairs. This experience of being treated as "intelligent discardables" completely destroys users' trust in the brand.

The consequence of trust collapse is an obstacle to sales conversion.

A survey by Ping An Securities shows that over 60% of consumers have doubts about the long-term service capabilities of "revived brands." Yu Tianyu, Director of Kailian Capital Research Institute, stated even more bluntly: "There is no such thing as 'small but beautiful' in the Chinese automotive market. The scale effect of car companies has become evident, and brand awareness is mature—these are not things that can be rebuilt in the short term."

Even though WM Motor has tried to reduce resistance in the consumer market through strategies such as trade-in subsidies for existing customers and bulk purchases for ride-hailing fleets, consumers still worry about whether they will once again be abandoned after making a purchase.

For example, NETA Auto was unable to locally produce the agreed number of vehicles in Thailand, resulting in the government withholding subsidies and dealers pursuing debts. This kind of "secondary breach of trust" will further heighten the market's caution towards the revival of brands.

Technical gaps are another fatal flaw.The pace of technological iteration in the new energy vehicle industry far exceeds that of traditional automobiles. The penetration rate of L2+ intelligent driving has soared from 39% to 53%, and the 800V platform is gradually becoming mainstream. During WM Motor’s suspension, it missed the development period of intelligent driving assistance systems and the 800V platform, resulting in a widening gap in product competitiveness compared to leading automakers.

For example, Xiaomi's SU7 has topped the monthly sales charts thanks to its advanced intelligent driving system, while WM Motor has yet to announce any related plans. BYD's technology, which allows a 400-kilometer range to be added in just five minutes, further highlights the outdated nature of WM Motor's 400V platform.

At the supply chain level, WM Motor needs to rebuild supplier relationships that were disrupted due to the production halt, but some core component companies have already shifted to cooperate with Xiaomi and Huawei, further limiting its ability to catch up technologically.

3. The Way to Break the Deadlock: From "Capital Game" to "Value Reconstruction"

To revive an automotive company using the "Lean Startup Theory," it is necessary to validate the market with a "Minimum Viable Product" rather than blindly expanding.

The key to revitalizing car companies in the face of the dual challenges of trust fissures and technological gaps lies in a three-dimensional strategy of "precise positioning + trust rebuilding + technology catch-up."

Step one: precisely position yourself, avoid competing with industry leaders, and focus on a niche market.

WM Motor plans to resume production of its mature models EX5/E5, using existing supply chains to quickly recover. HiPhi will continue to focus on high-end electric vehicles, avoiding direct competition with BYD and Xiaomi.

This "conservative strategy" essentially means "trading time for space"—reducing financial pressure through asset-light operations while buying time for technological upgrades.

For example, Jiyue Automobile reduces costs through a "Store+Station+Spot" three-tier channel system (direct-operated stores, partner outlets, and community service points), and focuses its restructuring negotiations on the safety review of intelligent driving assistance systems to ensure the technical bottom line.

Step 2: Rebuilding Trust, from "After-sales Guarantee" to "Ecosystem Integration."

Experts recommend implementing "automaker bankruptcy insurance," collecting premiums based on sales volume to provide after-sales protection for bankrupt brands. Meanwhile, WM Motor plans to reduce resistance in the C-end sales by offering trade-in subsidies for old customers and bulk purchases for ride-hailing to secure the B-end market.

Deeper trust rebuilding needs to be achieved through "ecosystem binding." For example, NIO builds user stickiness through its battery swapping system, while XPeng reshapes its technological image with the city NOA intelligent driving system.

Reviving car companies can learn from this logic by converting users from "one-time buyers" to "long-term service users" through models such as "charging network sharing" and "smart driving system subscriptions."

Step three: technological catch-up, from a "followership strategy" to "differentiated innovation."

The R&D investment intensity of tail-end car companies is less than 1/5 of that of leading enterprises, and talent loss further slows down the pace of technological catch-up.

The key to breaking the deadlock lies in "differentiated innovation."

For example, Nezha Auto is setting up a knock-down assembly plant in Thailand. Although this is considered a low-value model, it can circumvent tariff barriers through localized production and quickly capture the Southeast Asian market.

WM Motor can focus on the "range-extended electric vehicle" niche market to avoid the intense competition in the pure electric market. In terms of technology advancement, it should avoid being "comprehensive" and instead focus on "single-point breakthroughs." For example, Leapmotor has reduced costs through its self-developed CTC (Cell to Chassis) battery-chassis integration technology, achieving a breakthrough with "high cost-performance ratio."

The essence of the revival round is a "value restructuring competition."

The "revival wave" in the new energy vehicle industry is essentially the final struggle among capital, policy, and the market during the red ocean stage. The fate of companies like WM Motor, HiPhi, and Jiyue depends on whether they can achieve "value reconstruction" within a 3-6 month window—shifting from relying on capital infusions to self-sustaining operations, from repairing trust deficits to building ecological barriers, and from technological following to differentiated innovation.

As Zhu Jiangming, founder of Leapmotor, said, "In the end, there will be no more than 10 surviving car companies in the future." Every decision made by car companies seeking revival will be an "ultimate game" on the brink of life and death.